Philosophy of Science
Incongruent Counterparts and the Reality of Space
By , The University of Adelaide (March 2009)
Section: Philosophy of Science
Subjects: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics.
People: Kant, Immanuel .
Key Topic: realism.
Abstract
Left and right hands are incongruent counterparts. Yet each replicates the intrinsic properties of the other. This suggests that differing relations to space make the difference. Kant's and Weyl's discussions of the problem are critically discussed. It emerges that spatial relationism fails to explain how its relations may be interpreted. An excursion into visual geometry explains the basis of handedness in the orientable structure of space.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00212.x
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